Anyone who chooses to operate through their own company should not complain later if the court nevertheless classifies them as an employee. Or is it? On 18 May 2026, the Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal confirmed that even a deliberate, tax-motivated choice for a contract for services does not preclude the subsequent recognition of an employment contract \u2013 with all the associated benefits.<\/p>\n
What was the situation in this case?<\/strong><\/p>\n A chartered accountant with signing authority moved to an accountancy firm with six branches on 1 January 2025. The move was structured, on his own initiative, as a contract for services: it was not he himself, but his private company RET Administratie & Advies B.V. that entered into the contract with the firm. The parties explicitly stipulated that there was no employment contract and that the accountant would not be permitted to rely on this retrospectively.<\/p>\n The arrangements provided for a fixed monthly fee of \u20ac13,455 excluding VAT to the company, plus a car allowance of \u20ac1,449 per month. The accountant worked full-time, spending at least three days a week at the firm\u2019s offices, was entitled to 28 days\u2019 annual leave and was required to adhere to the firm\u2019s code of conduct, instructions and management regulations. His firm was not permitted to assign anyone else to the work without permission, nor was it permitted to provide services to third parties.<\/p>\n On 20 May 2025 \u2013 after more than four months \u2013 the firm terminated the assignment. The accountant accepted the end of the collaboration but took the view that there was in fact an employment contract that had not been lawfully terminated. He claimed compensation for wrongful termination, the transition payment and fair compensation. The subdistrict court largely ruled in his favour. The firm lodged an appeal.<\/p>\n The court of appeal\u2019s considerations and ruling<\/strong><\/p>\n The court of appeal upheld the subdistrict court\u2019s ruling: the contract for services must be reclassified as an employment contract. To this end, the court of appeal applied the so-called Deliveroo criteria of the Supreme Court. All facts and circumstances, taken together, are decisive.<\/p>\n The court of appeal points out that the work concerned the firm\u2019s core activities and that the accountant was fully integrated into these, working full-time and on a structural basis. There was an obligation for personal performance: the company was not permitted to deploy any other person. The accountant had no freedom to work for others and could not solicit business from other clients. He received a fixed monthly remuneration, regardless of the number of hours actually worked, with continued payment during holidays and in the event of short-term illness. There was no entrepreneurial risk whatsoever: he made no investments, his expenses were reimbursed and he acted internally and externally under the firm\u2019s banner. Finally, the firm determined which assignments he worked on, addressed him in the event of his absence and provided substantive instructions.<\/p>\n The Court of Appeal acknowledges that the accountant deliberately and in full knowledge of the facts opted for the arrangement with his company, partly to gain a tax advantage. It was only when the firm wished to terminate the collaboration earlier than he had expected that he invoked the protection of employment law. This may \u2018appear unsympathetic and opportunistic because he is thus having his cake and eating it\u2019, according to the court, but that does not alter the fact that, on the basis of all the facts and circumstances, an employment contract does exist. The mandatory nature of Article 7:610 of the Dutch Civil Code allows for no other conclusion. The court also rejected the firm\u2019s defence that this was a temporary employment or payroll arrangement: once it has been established that there is an employment contract between the parties, that same relationship cannot simultaneously be classified as a hiring-in arrangement.<\/p>\n Conversion of the assignment fee into wages<\/strong><\/p>\n A separate issue concerns the level of wages as the basis for the remuneration. The accountant argued that his full remuneration of \u20ac14,904 gross per month should be treated as wages. The Court of Appeal did not agree with this. The agreed remuneration already included various items that would apply separately under an employment contract: holiday entitlement, holiday pay, continued pay during short-term illness and compensation for additional travel time. Furthermore, a higher remuneration had been deliberately agreed to compensate for the lack of protection against dismissal, a transition payment and fair compensation. The Court of Appeal estimates the value of that \u2018flexibility premium\u2019 at \u20ac2,500 gross per month and deducts this, bringing the gross monthly wage to \u20ac10,945.<\/p>\n On the basis of this salary, the court awarded compensation for wrongful dismissal of \u20ac32,835 gross (three months\u2019 salary), a transition payment of \u20ac2,432.22 gross and fair compensation of \u20ac10,000 gross. The latter is lower than the amount awarded by the subdistrict court: as of 1 September 2025, the accountant already had a new job with a gross monthly salary of \u20ac8,640, which meant the difference in income remained limited.<\/p>\n